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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare commonly used Value-at-Risk measures 
calculated through Historical and Monte Carlo Simulations and to answer the question 
whether these measures adequately capture market risk in EU new member country. 
Data set of daily returns price for ten years period from 24 October 2000 to 30 April 
2010 was collected for the following market indices: SOFIX, S&P 500, NASDAQ, 
OMXS, FTSE 100 and DAX, to give representative overview of the developed world 
markets and compare them with the new EU member state Bulgaria. The behaviour of 
Value-at-Risk models with 99 % and 95 % confidence level using rolling data windows 
of 100 and 250 days is analyzed with the help of a range of backtesting procedures.  
 
Employed  tests  revealed  that  the  distribution  of  daily  returns  of  SOFIX  index  differs  
significantly from the Normal distribution, with high kutosis and large negative 
skewness. Highest Value-at-Risk violation levels were observed during periods with 
steep volatility jumps, which indicate that the measure reacts poorly to volatility 
changes and underestimate risk in turbulent market conditions. Based on the backtesting 
results it can be derived that VaR models that are commonly used in developed stock 
markets are not well suited for measuring market risk in EU new member states.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Value at risk, Historical Simulation, Monte Carlo Simulation, New EU 
member states  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The concept of risk and the ways to monitor and control it has drawn a great deal of 
attention again in the time of economic turbulence and volatile markets. Whenever 
uncertainty truly unveils its power, financial risk models seems to be caught in a 
surprise and lag behind in forecasting disastrous outcomes. History of financial 
cataclysms indicates that extreme events tend to happen much more often then the 
probabilities given to them by risk models, analysers and managers. In such manner the 
main purpose of risk management,  which is to provide safe net for bad economic 
conditions, is missed and it looks like “car airbag that works all the time except when 
you have an accident”(Einhorn 2008: 12).   
 
Table 1. Famous extreme market events. 
Name Dates 
Panic of 1907  Year 1907 
Wall Street Crash of 1929 Year 1929 
Recession of 1937–1938 (U.S.)  Year 1937 
1973–1974 stock market crash (U.K.)  Year 1973 
Silver Thursday  March 27, 1980  
Black Monday  October 19, 1987  
Japanese asset price bubble  Year 1990 
Black Wednesday  September 16, 1992  
1997 Asian Financial Crisis  Year 1997 
1997 mini-crash  October 27, 1997  
1998 Russian financial crisis  August 17, 1998  
dot-com bubble  March 10, 2000  
Sep-11 Terrorist Attacks September 11, 2001  
Stock market downturn of 2002  Year 2002 
Chinese correction  February 27, 2007  
United States bear market of 2007–2009  October 11, 2007  
Lehman Brothers bankrupt September 15, 2008 
 
Looking throughout the history different approaches toward measuring financial risk 
can be found. Harry Markowitz (1952) proposed mean-variance method for defining 
volatility in a portfolio. Asset liability management (ALM) model, dated to the high 
interest rate period in 70’s and 80’s measured discrepancy between debts and assets 
(Jorion 2000). Jack Treynor (1962), William Shaper (1964) and John Linter (1965) 
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introduced the Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that linked the expected rate of 
return of asset with standard deviation for portfolio diversification purposes.   
 
In  the  90’s  a  group  of  employees  of  J.P.  Morgan  Bank  developed  the  fundaments  of  
Value at Risk (VaR) methodology. Their endeavour was focused on giving a single 
money figure expressing possible worst loss, associated with the risk of a derivative, 
trader’s portfolio or even whole firm, given predefined probability level and time 
horizon (RiskMetrics 2009). After its public presentation from JPMorgan and the 
establishment of its Riskmetrics unit as independent consulting company, VaR fast 
became universal enterprise risk measure. VAR was also implemented by private 
institutions like the group of thirty (G30), consultative group on international economics 
and monetary affairs, the global association of risk professionals (GARP) and public 
regulators-General accounting office (GAO), the financial accounting standards board 
(FASB), securities and exchange commission (SEC) etc. making VaR the “gold 
standard” in the risk measurement area. Probably the most significant step was taken 
when The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) enacted their legislations, 
which became known as Basel Accords I and II, connecting VaR with the minimal 
capital requirements for commercial banks, set aside to protect against market risk.  
 
In less developed markets, the impact of banks regulation changes and VaR models, has 
not been studied good enough. Also, not all the member countries in EU 27 have 
conducted research what are impact and consequences because of changes in the 
banking sector. EU new member states lag behind the developed EU markets in many 
fields, particularly in subjects like market discipline, financial legislation, disclosure of 
financial and other information, insider trading, embezzlement, knowledge of markets, 
financial instruments and risks. Market regulators, investment funds and banks use the 
same models for measuring market risk and capital reserves requirements in both 
developed and new members markets, supposing equal behaviour and characteristics. 
Serious doubts can arise when the results of these VaR measures take leading role for 
risk governance and management. New EU member states have generally higher 
volatility and lower liquidity. Most of the different VaR calculation methods assume 
normal market, normal distribution of returns, no trading during the holding period and 
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liquidity of the assets (Jorion 2000). In the present turbulent economic reality these 
preconditions does not hold and it is important to check how VaR measures behave in 
extreme volatile environment, if the mechanism of risk prediction have to be improved. 
 
In the new EU member states, the alternatives to standard banking loans like issuing 
shares (preferential and ordinary) and debt securities (bonds and commercial papers) is 
increasingly popular. Because of possibility to earn high profits, the new tempting 
alternatives are attractive for all kind of foreign investors too (for companies, 
households, pension funds and banks). However, investors in these rapidly growing 
markets are not aware of potential important risks they can meet. It is easier to 
understand when small investors underestimate these risks, but then it comes to big 
institutional investors, the situation when they invest in transitional equity markets and 
choose wrong measuring instruments is not understandable and troubling. (Zikovic 
2007:326).    
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare commonly used VaR measures calculated 
through Historical and Monte Carlo Simulations and to answer the question whether 
these VaR measures adequately capture market risk in EU new member country. It will 
also compare VaR behaviour during the global recession with previous terms of high 
volatile  markets  as  well  as  stable  growth  periods  with  relative  calmness  of  trade.  The  
behaviour of these various models is analyzed over the simulation period with the help 
of a range of backtesting procedures to examine how accurately the models meet the 
specified confidence intervals. Backtesting is applied for ten years of historic price data 
of five major world market indices and the Bulgarian stock exchange index SOFIX in 
order to assess the accuracy of VaR predicting ability.  
 
This study also focuses on contributing to the ongoing discussion about the usefulness 
of single risk measure both for traders and regulatory bodies as more and more 
governments are looking toward reintroducing tighter monitoring and control over 
financial conglomerates. 
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The study questions whether VaR measures underestimate the existing risk during 
periods of market turbulence and high volatility and overestimates risk during periods 
of low volatility showing inefficiency to measure exceptional market movements and 
how effective they are in capturing market risk in EU new member state. Based on these 
questions the following hypotheses of this study are set: 
 
Hypothesis ? Stock Index returns in new EU member state are normally distributed. 
 
Hypothesis ?I Commonly used VaR measures adequately capture market risk in new EU 
member state. 
 
Hypothesis ?II  VaR underestimates risk during periods of high volatility and 
overestimates risk during periods of low volatility showing inefficiency in measuring 
extreme market movements. 
 
1.2 Outline of the study 
 
In order to examine the validity of these hypotheses the VaR calculations are done on 
the daily returns of the prices of five world major market indices S&P 500, FTSE 100, 
NASDAQ,  Dow  Jones,  DAX,  Stockholm  General  and  compared  with  SOFIX,  the  
market  index  of  the  new  EU  member  Bulgaria.  In  chapter  two,  definitions  of  general  
types of financial risk are presented for detailed overview of the topic. The theoretical 
framework and the history of VaR together with follow up of the development of VaR 
as standard for financial regulation are presented in chapter three. It also lists different 
public and private organizations and institutions adopting VaR for their needs. The 
existing literature on the topic and previous empirical studies are examined in the 
following chapter four to build on discussion of historic evidence in favour and against 
this risk measure. Chapter five is devoted to the methodology on which the calculations 
in this paper are based and the different approaches to backtesting VaR effectiveness in 
covering risk. The used data is described in chapter six, and calculations together with 
the obtained results are presented in chapter seven. Historical VaR values are calculated 
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for years 2000-2010. Based on a moving window of 100 and 250 previous trading days 
data VaR estimation will be calculated and compared with the real market realization, 
counting the number of times VaR measure under-predict  the daily loss. Additionally 
for each index two confidence levels of VaR, 95% and 99%, losses are compared. 
Chapter eight provides a number of concluding remarks and gives suggestion for future 
research.   
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2  GENERAL TYPES OF FINANCIAL RISK 
 
The definitions for risk found in finance theory state it as the dispersion of unexpected 
outcomes due to movements in financial variables. It is measured by the standard 
deviation of unexpected outcomes, which is sigma (?), or also called volatility. In 
financial markets volatility risk is the probability of fluctuations in the exchange rate of 
currencies. It actually is a probability measure of the threat that an exchange rate 
variation poses to an investor's portfolio in a foreign currency. Standard deviation over a 
dataset of exchange rate movements measures the volatility of the exchange rate. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, BSBC 2006.) 
 
Choudhury (2003) defines risk as a probability that outcomes could be damaging or it 
can  result  in  a  loss.  In  the  presence  of  risk,  the  outcomes  can  have  some  level  of  
uncertainty. Horcher (2005:2) define risk as a probability of loss, which is a result of 
exposure. Any type of risk associated with financial operations can be classified as 
financial risk. It can arise when business transactions, such as sales, loans or 
investments are initiated. Financial risk is a result of sudden price changes, financial 
fluctuations, interest rate changes, internal and external organisational actions and 
failures. (Horcher 2005:2).  
 
To distinguish between different causes of uncertainty Jorion (2000:14) describes five 
types of financial risk: market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk and legal 
risk.  
 
2.1 Market risk 
 
Market risk appears when financial market prices and rates are changing. It could be 
absolute, measured in currency units, e.g. Euros, and relative, the risk which is 
measured in comparison with a benchmark index (Jorion 2000: 14). According to 
Crouhy, Galai & Mark (2006: 26) there are 4 types of market risk: interest rate risk, 
foreign exchange risk, equity price risk and commodity price risk. Interest rate risk is 
the risk that fixed-income security value could fall because of interest rate changes. This 
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risk can also appear when the yield curve shape is changing because of the long-term 
and short-term interest rates. (Horcher 2005:27) Foreign exchange risk is the risk of 
holding or taking positions in foreign currencies, including gold. This risk arises 
because of translation and transaction operations. Translation risk could appear when 
the financial statements of the balance sheet (e.g. assets, liabilities) are translated from 
the one currency to another. Transaction risk can appear from ordinary transactions 
operations which can impact the profitability of the company. (Horcher 2005:30). 
Foreign exchange risk appears from fluctuations in currency or international interest 
rates. The multinational corporations are mostly suffering from this kind of risk. It can 
result in huge losses in investments returns and in order to avoid it, the daily 
observations of the changing exchange rates are needed.  (Crouhy 2006). 
 
Equity price risk consists of two components: “general market risk” and “specific” of 
“idiosyncratic” risk. “General market risk“ refers to a risk when changing broad stock 
market indices changes the financial instrument and portfolio value. “Specific” or 
“idiosyncratic” risk refers to volatility of the stock’s price that is determined by specific 
characteristics of the firm (breakdown in production process, quality in management, 
etc.).The difference between these risks is that portfolio diversification can eliminate 
general market risk, but cannot eliminate “specific” or “idiosyncratic” risk. (Crouhy 
2006). 
 
Another type of risk arising from holding or taking positions in commodities in the 
meaning of physical product traded on a secondary market, including precious metals, 
but excluding gold (treated as a foreign currency) is called commodity risk . Horcher 
(2005:35) divides commodity risk in two parts: commodity price risk and commodity 
quantity risk. Commodity price risk appears when the commodity prices are changing. 
This risk affects consumers and commodity producers. The rising commodity prices 
bring less profit for purchasers and the declining prices affect the revenues of producers. 
Commodity price risks in general have a high volatilities and large price discontinuities. 
(Crouhy 2006). The price risk in commodities is comparatively more sophisticated and 
volatile than that associated with currencies and interest rates. Commodity markets are 
not so liquid like those for interest rates and currencies. As a consequence, changes in 
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supply and demand can have a more striking effect on price and volatility. Effective 
hedging of commodities risk can be more demanding because of these market 
characteristics creating diminishing price transparency (BCBS 2006). This risk can be 
overcome, by offering commodity for domestic currency prices or allowing customers 
to calculate price by fixed exchange rate. It would be useful for smaller organizations, 
which cannot manage risk by themselves (Horcher 2005:36).  Commodity quantity risk 
can appear when market demand is not equal to supply. The producers can get losses 
from the too high or too low demand (Horcher 2005:36).  
 
2.2 Credit risk 
 
Credit risk is the main risk of banks, because they are taking credit risk when lending 
money in exchange to some return. Banks have a greatest challenge to manage their 
credit risk (Lore & Borodovsky 2000). Credit risk is associated with the probability of 
default from one of the parties to perform its obligations. Credit risk can appear in 
several forms. One, called sovereign risk, specific for countries, it is the events 
occurring when government restrictions are imposed on currency. Other one, settlement 
risk can appear in transaction payment from both sides made in the same day when one 
side fails to deliver the payment (Jorion 2000:15). Variety of this risk is Counterparty 
Credit Risk. That is  the probability that the counterparty to a transaction could default  
before it can deliver the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows. If the deal with 
counterparty  has  a  positive  value  at  the  time  of  default  then  a  loss  would  occur.  In  
contrast with the unilateral exposure to credit risk through a loan, where only the 
lending bank faces the risk of loss, counterparty credit risk is a bilateral risk of loss. The 
market value of the transaction can have plus or minus sign to both counterparties. This 
market value can vary over time with the movement of underlying market factors 
(BCBS 2006).  
 
A risk directly related to the counterparty credit risk is rollover risk. If transactions with 
a certain partner are expected to be carried on an ongoing basis in the future, but at the 
present moment they are not included in the calculations of positive exposure, the 
rollover risk arises. It can be two types: general, when the possibility of default on the 
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partner side is positively correlated to general market risk factors, or specific when the 
positive correlation is due to the nature of the transaction. An example of specific 
wrong-way rollover risk is when a future exposure to a specific counterparty is going to 
be high when the counterparty’s probability of default is also high. (BCBS 2006: 254-
257.) 
 
2.3 Operational risk 
  
Operational risk appears from technical or human accidents or errors. It can be a result 
of management failure, wrong instructions or misleading information (Jorion 2000:17). 
Operational risk can be two types: operational strategic risk (external) and operational 
failure risk (internal). Operational strategic risk can appear because of not well chosen 
strategy in response to environmental factors, e.g. regulation, taxation, politics or 
competition.  Operational failure risk arises from the failure of people, technologies or 
processes inside the company (Lore & Borodovsky 2000: 344). Operational risk could 
be also a model risk which appears when inappropriate model or inadequate framework 
is used or applied for the wrong purpose. (Jorion 1997:16). 
 
2.4 Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity is a term for describing financial instruments, their markets and the 
companies’ financial abilities. It is the ability to make the payments and financial 
transactions. (Lore & Borodovsky 2000:443) Liquidity risk is a risk which arises when 
transaction cannot be done at dominant market prices, (Jorion 2000:17), when the 
ability to sell or purchase obligations or securities is limited (Horcher 2005:44), or when 
the company or financial institution runs out of liquid assets to finance the operations. 
The management of liquidity risk includes the understanding the place of liquidity of 
organisation, and how to deal liquidity, in the critical situations, e.g. when the shortfall 
arises. (Lore & Borodovsky 2000:443.) 
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In order to reduce liquidity risk, the company could reduce unusual or highly 
customised transactions, also transaction where liquidity depends on a small number of 
players. (Horcher 2005:44). 
 
2.5 Legal risk 
 
Potential loss arising from failure of a transaction due to improper legal or regulatory 
authorities’ proceedings qualifies as legal risk. This type of risk has direct links to credit 
risk. Market manipulations, insider trading and suitability restrictions are well known 
examples of such illegal activities. It can come from a foreign country with inadequate 
bankruptcy protection or from a court decision against a counterpart in transaction. 
(Jorion 2000: 18.) 
 
2.6 Systemic risk 
 
The risk that whole financial markets will fail to operate or will operate inefficiently is 
called systemic risk. Recent example of systemic risk was the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers that marked the peak of the recent economic recession. It had a domino effect 
on many banks and insurance institutions over the globe to spread uncertainty and 
volatility in gigantic proportions. The trust in all market mechanisms was undermined 
and entire financial system was in jeopardy. It is difficult to evaluate such risk because 
of the infrequent nature of such rare events. Derivatives allow for the spreading of risk 
across previously unrelated markets, raising the probability of large shock transition 
(with negative magnitude) from one market to others. Systemic risk of payment systems 
refers to the risk that liquidity problems at one financial institution will be passed on to 
others. 
 
2.7 Other types of risk 
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Concentration risk is dealing with the dispersion of a bank's outstanding accounts over 
the variety of debtors to whom the bank has lent money. A "concentration ratio" is used 
to  measure  this  risk.  This  ratio  examines  what  percentage  of  the  outstanding  accounts  
each bank loan represents. When loans are moved toward a specific economic sector 
that would move the ratio higher than a portfolio of evenly spread loans, because greater 
diversification offsets the risk of economic downturn and default in any specific 
industry. An important factor in concentration risk is the risk of default. The most 
significant issue for the banks is whether bank's outstanding loans is equal to the overall 
risk posed by the economy as a whole, or are the bank's loans concentrated in areas of 
higher or lower than average risk. (BCBS 2006.) 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF VAR 
 
Holton (2003) made the first distinction between risk measures and risk metrics. 
Duration, delta, beta, and volatility are all risk metrics, and the procedure by which they 
are calculated is called risk measure. It is important to make such distinction because 
there is no exact correlation between risk measures and risk metrics. There are many 
metrics of risk—volatility, delta, gamma, duration, convexity, beta, etc. Measure that 
supports a risk metric is referred to as a risk measure. Risk measures are categorized 
depending on to the risk metrics they support. (Holton 2003.) 
 
Beta is one of the risk metrics generally applied in the equity markets. It measures the 
systematic risk of a single instrument or an entire portfolio. The notion of beta was first 
used by Sharpe (1964) as part of his capital asset pricing model (CAPM) presented on 
figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Capital asset pricing model 
 
Beta represents the sensitivity of an instrument or portfolio to extensive market 
movements. The stock market or the general market index is assigned a beta of 1.  Then 
portfolios are compared to it. If portfolio has beta equal to 2 it is twice more riskier than 
the market. Oppositely if the value is under 1 it will be less exposed to price moves than 
the general market index. The formula for beta is: 
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where the dividend equals the covariance between portfolio return and the market 
return, and the divisor is the variance of the market's return or the volatility squared. 
Simple returns method is used for calculating both quantities.  Beta is usually calculated 
from historical prices time series. There is a possibility to construct beta portfolios 
which are negative. Different approaches to do it can include shorting stocks, holding 
stocks (e.g. gold mining stocks) which have a tendency to move opposite to market or 
setting up appropriate options spreads. Beta can be used sometimes while measuring a 
market risk of portfolio. However, beta cannot capture specific risk and its value can be 
misleading. If the portfolio price volatility has low correlation with the market index 
this will result in low beta value, but still prices fluctuation can be significant. (Jorion 
2000.) 
 
Quite often the change in the value of the underlying asset is the main source of market 
risk for derivatives. There are two measures, delta and gamma, dealing with sensitivity 
to these changes. Delta ?  is most probably the widest used concept in risk 
management. Delta shows how small changes in the price of the currency, commodity 
or underlying asset, denoted by I  in equation 2, affects the theoretical price of portfolio 
or an instrument )(IP : 
 
(2) 
I
IP
?
??? )(  
 
Sensitivity analysis is also closely related with Delta concept. This concept was 
developed for options, but it can also be applied to cash positions and other derivatives. 
(Linsmeier and Pearson 1996:25.) 
 
The conventional definition of Gamma (? ) comes straight from the calculation method. 
Gamma  is  the  second  partial  derivative  of  delta  with  respect  of  the  value  of  the  
underlying asset, currency, or commodity. If we denote the spot price of the underlying 
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asset with I and  the  option  price  as  a  function  of  I  with )(IP , then gamma of the 
option can be calculated by equation 3:  
 
(3) 2
2 )()(
I
IP
I
I
?
???
????  
 
By measuring Delta changes (which can appear from changes in commodity, currency 
or underlying assets) Gamma complements Delta. (Linsmeier and Pearson1996:26-27.) 
 
Delta and Gamma may be the most important measures for derivatives concerning 
market risk sensitivity, but derivatives are additionally exposed to implied volatilities, 
interest rates, and the passage of time. These market factors are covered by the Greek 
measures vega, rho, and theta consequently. 
 
Much more complex extension of CAPM and measures described above is the Value at 
Risk method, which helps to determine the actual risk exposure of a portfolio to 
multiple risk factors. VaR methodology is similar to traditional market risk 
measurement methods in such way that VaR uses measurement of the dispersion of an 
asset's return during predefined time window around the asset's average return during 
that same time. The difference is that VaR expresses the downside of that dispersion, 
the loss in a single figure, while traditional methods apply statistical analysis to 
determine the standard deviation of those returns. (Van de Venter 2000:186.)  
 
 
3.1 Definition of VaR 
 
The formal definition of VaR given by Jorion (2000:88) states: 
“VaR describes the quantile of the projected distribution of gains and losses over a 
target horizon. In general form VaR can be derived from the probability distribution of a 
future portfolio f(w). At a given confidence level c VaR represents the worst possible 
realization W* such as the probability of exceeding this value is c: 
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or such that the probability of a value lower than W*, p=P(w?W*), is 1-c: 
 
(5) ?
??
?????
*
*)()(1
W
pWwPdwwfc  
 
The number W* is called the quantile of the distribution, which is the cutoff value with 
a fixed probability of being exceeded.” 
 
 
Figure 2. VaR diagram for normal distribution. 
 
 
Advantages of VaR include the simplicity and elegance of its result-a single money 
figure and its possible implication to any kind of assets. The disadvantages are its 
ignorance  of  all  risk  above  certain  level  and  its  vulnerability  to  fraud  by  traders.  
Calculation can be difficult when a portfolio consist of many different instruments. 
 
The first company that introduced VaR measure was Bankers Trust. Their risk-adjusted 
return  on  capital  system  (RAROC)  adjusts  profits  for  capital  at  risk,  defined  as  the  
amount of capital needed to cover 99 percent of the maximum expected loss over a year. 
1-year horizon is used for all RAROC computations, no matter what the actual holding 
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period is, in order to allow better comparisons across different types of assets (Jorion 
2000:77).  
 
At  the  early  90’s  Dennis  Weatherstone,  the  chairman  of  JP  Morgan  established  the  
classical framework of VaR in a “4:15 report” that he required from his employees. It 
contained measurement of the boundaries of all company risks on one page, available 
within 15 minutes of the market closure. In 1993 on an annual conference the bank 
made its risk model public and vastly disseminated VaR. They made it separate from 
the  mother  company,  establishing  a  consulting  firm  RiskMetrics  to  improve  the  
methodology. (Nocera 2009.) 
 
3.2 Regulatory Capital Standards 
 
The level of regulation of free market is a sensitive topic that has been driven back and 
forth when free market does not meet the general public expectations. In a case of 
extreme systemic risk bank deposits are destabilized. Deposit insurances alone offer not 
enough protection and government guarantees and bail outs have to be introduced. 
Guarantees are necessary to protect small depositors who cannot efficiently monitor 
their bank. Such monitoring is complex, expensive, and time consuming. For these 
reasons a unified standard across countries is needed. (Jorion 1997:42-44.)  
 
3.2.1 Basel Accord I 
 
After a series of discussions in 1988 the central bankers of the G10 member countries 
and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) brought out set of rules for the 
minimal capital requirements of banks. These rules define a common measure of 
solvency to cover the credit risk and arrange revealing of information about the debtors 
of banks. The Basel Accord requires capital charge no less than 8% of the total risk 
weighted assets of the bank (Jorion 2000:45). The regulatory capital itself consists of 
two components: 
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Tier 1 capital or “core” capital includes only permanent shareholders equity and 
disclosed reserves.  Disclosed reserves also include general funds of the same quality. 
The general definition of capital excludes revaluation reserves and cumulative 
preference shares. General loan losses reserves represent capital that is available to the 
bank to meet losses, and when they occur they can not be charged directly to the fund 
but must be taken through the profit and loss account (BCBS 1995). 
 
Tier 2 capital or ”supplementary” capital includes perpetual securities, undisclosed 
reserves, subordinated debt with maturity longer than five years, general provisions or 
loan loss reserves held against future. Since long term debt has a junior status relative to 
depositors, debt is considered to be a buffer to protect depositors (BCBS 1995). 
 
At  least  half  of  the  total  capital  charge  of  8%  must  be  covered  by  tier  1  capital.  The  
capital divided by the risk weighted assets is referred to as risk based capital ratio and 
upon it the following restrictions were set: 4% minimum on tier 1 capital and 8 % 
minimum on total sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capitals. Under this regulations banks assets 
were separated into different categories with appropriately assigned risk weights to 
reflect associated underlying risk.  
 
Table 2. Risk capital weights by asset class. (Source: BCBS 1995) 
Weight Asset Type 
0% U.S. Treasury and obligations 
Cash held 
Gold 
20% Cash to be received 
Claims on banks 
U.S. government agency securities 
Agency  
Municipal general obligation bonds 
50% Municipal revenue bonds 
100% Corporate bonds 
Less developed country debt 
Equity 
Real estates 
Plant and equipment 
Mortgage strips and residuals 
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The Basel Accord I tried to set limits on “excessive risk takings” by demanding reports 
for all positions larger then 10 % of bank capital and capping this “large risks” to max 
25%. The sum of all “large risks” should not exceed 800% of capital (Jorion 2000:47). 
Basel Accord I passed legislation in G10 countries in year 1992 and currently more than 
100 countries have affiliated its regulations (BCBS 1995).  
 
The expansion of VaR popularity did not stop and in 1993 in a report the international 
body of economic and financial issues (G30) recommended its use as a consistent daily 
market risk measure (Global Derivatives Study Group 1993).  
 
Significant shortfalls of Basel Accord I were revealed shortly after unveiling. Inability 
to account for the portfolio risk diversification, credit risk can be diversified across 
issuers, industries or geographical locations. The regulations do not associate the 
“netting” effect, when bank matches borrowers and lenders, and in such way decrease 
the counter default risk. The poor recognition of market risk such as interest rate risk in 
the regulations was also blamed. Pricing of assets was measured as book values which 
may vary significantly from market values and the accounting lag will cover additional 
exposures of the balance sheet.  (Jorion 2000:47.) 
 
The BCBS took into consideration these shortfalls and started moving the methodology 
toward measuring market risk with the VaR approach.  
 
3.2.2 The Standardized Method  
 
The Committee allowed bank to choose between two different methodologies when it 
comes  to  calculating  capital  requirements  for  credit  risk.  The  primer  choice  is  the  
Standardized Approach. Under it VaR was computed for portfolios exposed to interest 
rate risk, exchange rate risk, equity risk, and commodity risk with exact guidelines for 
each of them, issued by the commission. These instructions covered all fixed-rate and 
floating-rate debt securities, including non-convertible preference shares The sum of all 
this  categories  equals  the  total  bank  VaR.  The  method  name  comes  from  the  risk  
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structuring and the standardization of the process. External credit assessments of rating 
companies are also taken in consideration in the calculations of capital reserves. (BSBC 
1995.) 
 
3.2.3 The Internal Model Approach  
 
Many banks have chosen to implement the second alternative to measure market risk, 
internal model based approach. This model suggested the bank’s internal assessment of 
risk to serve as input for the capital reserves calculation. When introduced back in 1995 
the internal model approach gave for first time to big banks the opportunity to use their 
own risk management systems to determine their capital charges. The computation of 
VaR under the Internal Model was based on a set of uniform quantitative inputs 
? a horizon of 10 trading days, or two calendar weeks 
? a 99 % confidence interval 
? an observation period based on at least one year of historical data and updated at 
least once a quarter. (Jorion 1997:50.) 
Internal model accounts for correlations in broad categories such as fixed incomes, as 
well as across categories between fixed income and currencies. The capital charge, 
according to the model, was set at the higher of the previous day VaR or the average 
VaR over the last 60 days times a “multiplicative” factor. The mathematical equation 
(6) representing the general market risk charge on any day t  is: 
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where k  is the supervisory determined multiplicative factor. Local regulators got the 
authority to set the exact value of this factor, but it must be no less than of 3. This factor 
was supposed to provide further protection against market environments that are more 
volatile than historical data suggests. A penalty component could be added to this 
multiplicative factor if backtesting shows that the bank internal model forecasts risks in 
a wrong way. The possibility to change the value of this factor should stimulate banks 
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to improve the accuracy of their prediction models and to avoid optimistic estimations 
of  profits  and  losses  due  to  model  fitting.  The  whole  system  was  designed  to  reward  
truthful international monitoring and establish sound risk management systems. (Jorion 
1997:50.)  
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In order to gain total capital adequacy requirements, banks were required to sum up 
their credit risk charge together with their market risk charge, applied to normal 
operations. For the fact that additional capital have to be putted aside, banks were 
allowed to use new class of capital, tier 3, which consists of short term subordinated 
debt.  The  amount  of  tier  3  capital  was  limited  to  250  %  of  tier  1  capital  allocated  to  
support market risks. (Jorion 1997:52.)  
 
Internal Model Approach demanded from the national authorities to put substantial 
efforts to ensure consistency in its application. To qualify as eligible to use the Internal 
Model banks had to fulfil a list of quantitative and qualitative requirements. The 
Committee intentions to monitor and review the way the framework was introduced led 
to the establishment of Accord Implementation Group (AIG) for promoting 
framework’s application consistency. (BCBS 1996.) 
 
The advantage of Internal Model Approach was pointed out to be the possibility to use 
regulatory capital requirements to supervise the moral hazard risks that appear when 
banks benefit from mispriced safety net guarantees or from the “too big to fail” notion. 
 
3.2.4 Basel Accord II 
 
The second issue of BCBS originally published June 2004 as Basel accord II revised the 
framework  of  recommendations  on  banking  laws  and  regulations.  It  is  applied  to  all  
internationally active banks ensuring that capital allocation is more risk sensitive. It 
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meant to preserve the integrity of capital in banks and assure that the risks of the whole 
banking group are captured. This framework differentiated operational from credit risk 
and quantified them both following VaR methodology. It tries to line up economic and 
regulatory capital closer to each other and to reduce the possibility for regulatory 
arbitrage. Also, it enables supervisors with standardized tools to test if individual banks 
are adequately capitalised on a stand-alone basis with the principal objectives of 
protection of depositors ensuring them that the capital recognised in capital adequacy 
measures are available. (BCBS 2006:2.) 
 
The key elements used in the 1988 capital adequacy framework are still kept by the 
Committee.  The  requirements  for  banks  total  capital  reserves  have  to  be  equal  to  
minimum 8% of  all  assets  which  were  risk-weighted.  This  represented  eligible  capital  
definition.  However,  the  Committee  wants  to  find  better  requirements  which  can  take  
into account more risk-sensitive capital.   
 
Basel Accord II uses a "three pillars" concept. The first one deals with the definition of 
eligible regulatory capital, minimum capital requirements addressing credit, operational 
and market risk. For computing each of them there is a choice of tools offered: credit 
risk can be measured using standardized approach, in a standardised manner, supported 
by external credit assessments. Foundation "Internal Rating-Based Approach" (IRB) 
which is subject to the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor, would allow banks to 
use  their  internal  rating  systems  for  credit  risk.  Bank  can  also  use  advanced  IRB.  
Similarly, there are three ways to calculate operational risk: basic indicator approach 
(BIA), standardized approach (TSA), and the internal measurement approach. For 
market risk the proposed approach is VaR. The second pillar treats supervisory review 
and introduces the key principles of risk management guidance and supervisory 
transparency. There are four of them;  
 
“Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy 
in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
 
Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments  and  strategies,  as  well  as  their  ability  to  monitor  and  ensure  their  
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compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
 
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
 
Principle  4:  Supervisors  should  seek  to  intervene  at  an  early  stage  to  prevent  capital  
from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a 
particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored.” (BSBC 2006.) 
 
Pillar two includes guidance related to treatment of interest rate risk in the banking 
book, stress testing, definition of default, residual risk, and enhanced cross-border 
communication and cooperation. Supervisory standards allow supervisors to require 
buffer capital for risks, not covered under pillar one. (BCBS 2006:204.) 
 
Pillar three reveals qualitative and quantitative disclosure requirements for the different 
model approaches choices in pillar two. It aims to improve market discipline by 
developing sets of disclosure requirements which allow market participants to assess 
relevant information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment 
processes, therefore the whole capital adequacy of an institution. In such way 
comparison between banks is made easier. (BCBS 2006:226.) 
 
The European Commission has adopted Europe wide capital requirements known as the 
Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD). The CAD was published 1993, laying down 
minimum levels of capital to be adopted for EU banks and security houses, extending 
the Basel guidelines. (CAD 2003.) 
  
Indeed, Basel Accord II gave the biggest commercial banks more discretion in assessing 
capital requirements by reliance on their own internal methodologies and calculation 
results to set the capital requirements. This was a highly controversial deed in the light 
of the recent financial regulators malfunction.  
 
3.2.5 Backtesting 
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Backtesting is a statistical procedure designed to compare realised trading results with 
model generated risk measures in order to evaluate the accuracy of the model 
(RiskMetrics 2000:39). It matches daily profits and losses with the VaR measure to 
assess the quality of banks risk modelling. Backtesting means counting the number of 
times that the trading return outcomes were larger than the risk measures. The actual 
covered fraction can then be compared with the intended level of coverage. If the 
comparison is close enough backtesting leads to no other issues, but if significant 
differences are revealed, immediate actions have to be taken. Banks can be asked to 
raise additional capital reserves and improve their risk management system. According 
to BCBS (1996:5) the backtesting framework should involve the use of risk measures 
calibrated to one-day holding period. It requires formal testing and accounting of 
exceptions on a quarterly basis using the most recent twelve months of data. The 
backtesting results are put into green, yellow or red zone according to the numbers of 
exceptions. This traffic light system signals the quality of banks risk models. Sorting 
results into zones take into account both the probability of rejecting an accurate model 
and accepting inaccurate model to be true. (BCBS 1996.) 
 
Table 3. Backtesting result zones (Source: BCBS 1996) 
Zone Number of exceptions Increase in scaling factor 
Cumulative 
probability 
Green 
Zone 0 0 8.11% 
 1 0 28.58% 
 2 0 54.32% 
 3 0 75.81% 
 4 0 89.22% 
Yellow 
Zone 5 0.4 95.88% 
 6 0.5 98.63% 
 7 0.65 99.60% 
 8 0.75 99.89% 
 9 0.85 99.97% 
Red Zone 10 or more 1 99.99% 
 
Using the number of exceptions as the main reference point in backtesting process is 
simple and straightforward approach that appeals to most supervisors and regulators. 
(BCBS 1996:14.)  
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Backtests are independent of VaR calculating process and can show whether VaR 
calculation methods exhibits correct unconditional and conditional coverage. This 
process is used as an indicator to the quality of the bank risk management and is 
referred as “backtesting”. (BCBS 1996:1). Institutions like The Global Association of 
Risk Professionals (GARP), General Accounting Office (GAO), The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
found backtesting useful for developing their own risk measurements. Regulators could 
penalize banks by increase in the scaling factor when calculating their market risk 
provisions, due to the use of a risk measurement model with a lot of errors. (Zikovic 
2007:326) 
 
Several individual cases of market collapse of big hedge funds happened, like Long 
Term Capital Management “LTCM”, which looking retroactively to the recent financial 
crisis is similar and closely connected with taking excessive risk (Das 2008). Also Stock 
market crash of 1987, 1990’s “Junk bond crisis”, the Mexican, Asian and Russian 
market crises took the sophisticated risk models by surprise. Extreme events tend to 
happen much more often than the probabilities values that they were given, and though 
academic research pointed out most malfunctions of VaR measurements little was done 
for the practical implementations of these warnings, as Satyajit Das (2006) mentioned: 
 
“A number (VaR) is produced for an audience that unquestioningly accepts it at face 
value and are content.” 
 
The debate escalated recently to a level that certain theorist like Taleb (2007) advocate 
for  complete  abolishment  of  VaR  as  representative  measure  of  risk,  stressing  that  
certainty  and  randomness  applied  to  real  world  conditions  may mislead  us  to  a  tragic  
proportions. Traders also started to agree with such extreme statements, which is 
prudent contemplating mind spinning write offs in the balance sheets. (Mihn 2008: 2) 
 
“A 99% VaR calculation does not evaluate what happens in the last 1%. This, in my 
view, makes VaR relatively useless as a risk management tool and potentially 
catastrophic when its use creates a false sense of security among senior managers and 
watchdogs” (Einhorn 2008). 
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However, the scale of the crisis suggests there is not only one single factor, e.g. Value at 
Risk concept, that can be blamed for and it is more likely that the human greed and 
abuse of the regulations led to crash (Nocera 2009). Testing VaR models again with the 
market data from the biggest recession since WWII is interesting and important for 
evaluating the real reasons. 
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4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The theoretical framework for modern portfolio theory and foundations of efficient 
portfolios were established by Markowitz (1959). His mathematical modelling gave 
optimized solution for reducing risk by combining different financial instruments that 
are not perfectly positively correlated. Later, Sharpe (1963) introduced Asset pricing 
model, or the single index model as it came became known, to measure the risk and 
return of stocks by connecting their performance to market indices. These initial basic 
works and their modifications set the foundations for the introduction of VaR and 
advanced risk management techniques. The interest toward developing risk 
management in the early 90’s, after the stock market crashes, was boosted by regulatory 
authorities who set risk-based capital adequacy requirements on financial institutions 
(cf. Dimson & Marsh 1995). The improvement in knowledge about risk management 
was marked by few significant research work and studies. In academics, Engle (1982) 
pioneered the development of volatility models for measuring and forecasting volatility 
dynamics. In business world the introduction of RiskMetrics by J.P. Morgan (1996) 
standardized the measures used by traders to compute credit and market risk (viz. 
RiskMetrics Tehnical Document 1996). As Riskmetrics offered a benchmark 
methodology, the interest of academics was set upon testing alternatives and making 
possible improvements. Still most of the early analyses like Beder (1995), Hendricks 
(1996), Marshall and Seigel (1997) and  Pritsker (1997) were limited to examining the 
difference between modelling approaches and explaining implementation procedures 
with the use of illustrative portfolios. Notable research work was conducted by 
Christoffersen, Harm and Inoue (2001). They developed a testing procedure for the 
acceptability of VaR method measuring the confidence level with the actual realized 
percentage of VaR breaks realized loss bigger then VaR prediction and described how 
VaR measures can be compared. The authors used GARCH and Riskmetricks models 
based on daily returns for S&P 500. 
 
Different statistical methodologies for evaluating the accuracy of VaR models emerged, 
namely evaluation constructed on the binomial distribution of VaR breaks proposed by 
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Kupiec (1995), distribution forecast evaluation as introduced by Crnkovic and 
Drachman (1995) and Christoffersen (1998) interval forecast evaluation. Lopez (1995) 
proposed methodology, based on probability forecasting framework. A new evaluation 
discussed by, is proposed. This methodology gauges the accuracy of VaR models using 
forecast evaluation techniques. It provided regulatory agencies more flexibility to 
defining appropriate loss function. These methodologies count for whether the VaR 
forecasts display properties of accurate VaR forecasts. 
 
Campbell (2005) examined variety of backtests which analyzed how adequate are VaR 
measures. Backtesting was reviewed from different angles, from the risk management 
and statistical contexts in his paper. Backtests were sorted in three groups: in one group, 
the ones which examine the independence property of VaR measure, other group 
examining the unconditional coverage property and the last group contains backests 
which examine both properties. Statistical power properties of these tests were analyzed 
in a simulation experiment. Ultimately, backtests shortfalls were discussed. (Campbell 
2005.) 
   
Duffie and Pan (1997) concentrate their attention on market risk associated with 
changes in prices or rates of underlying trade instruments over short time horizons. 
Whether VaR is accurate measure of the risk of financial distress over a short time 
period depends on the liquidity of the portfolio of positions and global market liquidity 
in general. Most common VaR models suggest normal distribution or of price changes, 
but the studied data for commodity and equity markets, exchange and interest rates 
revealed significant amounts of positive kurtosis. The authors concluded that the 
probability distributions of daily changes in these variables have “fat tails” and so 
extreme outcomes appear more often than the normal distribution assumption 
anticipates. Duffie and Pan pinpointed jumps and stochastic volatility as probable 
causes of kurtosis. They showed that under a jump diffusion model kurtosis is a 
declining function of the time horizon. If a stochastic volatility model is used, kurtosis 
is an increasing function of the time horizon normally used in VaR calculations. (Duffie 
and Pan 1997.) 
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The issue of relaxing normal distribution assumption was also addressed by Hull and 
White (1998). In the model they proposed, users are allowed to choose any probability 
distribution for the daily changes in each market variable. The parameters of the 
distribution were subjected to updating schemes such as GARCH. Distinctive feature of 
this model is the way it treats correlations. Daily changes in each market variable were 
transformed into a new variable that is normally distributed. After this conversion the 
new variables are considered multivariate normal. Tests of the model were done with 
data for twelve different exchange rates over nine years of price history, and the authors 
reported that the predictions for distributions of daily changes based on the first half of 
the data window were already good enough for the second half of the period. (Hull and 
White 1998.) 
 
After BCBS gave the large banks privilege to use their own internal risk models to set 
up capital reserves with the second Basel Accord, a major challenge for banks 
regulators became the verification of the accuracy of this models. Verification is viewed 
as  a  protection  that  banks  will  not  try  to  speculate  with  the  regulation  rules  by  model  
fitting. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) were one of the first to evaluate the actual 
performance of the banks trading risk models by examining the statistical accuracy of 
the VaR forecasts. They used data of 6 large U.S. banks that followed Basel regulations 
and did calculation for a 99 percent lower critical value of aggregate trading profit and 
loss (P&L) with a one-day horizon. They evaluated the VaR forecasts by testing null 
hypothesis of a 99 percent coverage rate and discovered that VaR estimates tend to be 
conservative relative to this percentile of P&L. Banks showed tendency to overstate 
VaR figures in fear of higher capital reserves sanctions. Berkowitz and O’Brien 
reported that tested VaR models do not include forecasts of net fee income, but this fee 
is included in daily P&L, and this practice gives the VaR forecasts a conservative bias. 
Nevertheless, authors also observed that at some times losses can largely exceed VaR 
and such extreme events tend to be clustered. The authors concluded that banks models, 
with all their approximations for the thousands of existing risk factors, have troubles 
predicting changes in the volatility of P&L.  
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Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) results suggest that the bank VaR models do not 
contribute to a better forecasts more than simple GARCH model of P&L volatility that 
grants comparable risk coverage with less regulatory capital. This is due to the GARCH 
model higher responsiveness to changes in P&L volatility. P&L correlations across 
banks  are  potential  concern  to  bank  regulators  because  of  the  thread  of  systemic  risk,  
the simultaneous realization of large losses at several banks. For evaluating exposures to 
liquidity or other market crisis, banks are limited to stress testing. Reported VaR 
conservative estimates suggest greater levels of capital coverage for trading risk, but 
they are less useful as a measure of actual portfolio risk. (Berkowitz and O’Brien 2002.)  
 
To find answer to the question which method of calculating VaR works best, Linsmeier 
and Pearson (1996) compared Historical simulation, the variance-covariance method 
and Monte Carlo simulation on the following list of criteria: ability to capture the risks 
of options and option-like instruments, ease of implementation, ease of explanation to 
senior management, flexibility in analyzing the effect of changes in the assumptions, 
and reliability of the results. For each approach they briefly described the procedure 
how to perform the analysis on single instrument portfolio and how it can be expanded 
for multiple instrument portfolio. Linsmeier and Pearson identified great variations 
across methods and could not provide clear answers. The two simulations they tested, 
Historical and Monte Carlo Simulation, seemed to work well for combined portfolios of 
options because they recalculated the value of the portfolio for each "draw" of the basic 
market factors and have good estimation for the statistical distribution, though, wrong 
choices  could  lead  to  potential  error  in  Monte  Carlo  simulation  and  the  obtained  VaR 
results. Similarly, the distribution of Historical Simulation would be misleading if the 
historical samples were not enough representative.  
 
Linsmeier and Pearson reported that atypical price period (e.g. low volatility) produced 
lower  value  VaR  and  the  authors  explained  how  these  biases  can  be  exploited  by  
informed traders to take more risky positions than the regulators have intended. The 
study displays that historic data contains unreasonable approximation of future. Authors 
concluded that in case one wants to incorporate what-if scenarios, MCS is most 
appropriate choice. Linsmeier and Pearson (1996) explained the theoretical possibility 
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to include in both simulations randomness of volatility though they did not actually test 
it. HS was found to be the easiest method to implement and explain to senior managers 
and shareholders, while MS was hardest. VaR methodology was found to be not useful 
for smaller nonfinancial corporations that might find it difficult to combine such 
complex measure. Instead "cash flow at risk" or simple sensitivity analyses were 
proposed to be adequate for SME’s. (Linsmeier & Pearson 1996.) 
 
More recent comparison between VaR methods was done by Yamai and Yoshiba 
(2002). Focusing on tail risk, they illustrate how it can bring serious practical problems. 
They found out that information given by VaR may mislead rational investors, and 
employing  only  VaR  as  a  risk  measure  is  likely  to  result  in  a  larger  loss  in  the  states  
beyond the VaR level. Their research works show that if the event window chosen for 
the simulation does not contain enough volatility, then accordingly VaR number will be 
smaller, so longer time horizon would be preferable. Furthermore, the usability of VaR 
for longer time periods was studied by Culp, Mensink, and Neves (1998) who found 
that it gives practical information for estimation of market risk for multicurrency asset 
managers. Comparing 100 days with 250 days of trading windows, Beder (1996:12) 
also found that the shorter one appears to be inadequate. Nevertheless, these results 
showed significant bias due to the fact that he used small data sample and this made the 
left  tail  of  the  distribution  tricky  to  measure. Longer data windows usage was 
encouraged by the empirical research of Hendricks (1996), in which the longest samples 
produced the best performance. However, there is problem with longer data periods, 
precisely the fact that even one unusual return keeps volatility estimates high, and this 
abnormal high estimation will last the same amount of time afterwards, even though the 
underlying volatility may have returned to normal levels, as was shown by Alexander & 
Leigh (1997:53). 
Pritsker (2006) inspected the HS method and the Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) 
method. With changes in conditional risk both methods were not reacting fast enough. It 
turned out also, that while large losses increase VaR measure, large gains (suggesting 
highly risky positions) do not affect it at all. Pritsker (2006) comparison showed FHS 
method to be better though its risk estimates were varying in small samples. The 
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assumption of constant correlation in FHS methodology was proven to be false for large 
samples, and the author argues that both methods needed additional refinements for 
time-varying correlations. This problem is directly related to the choice of appropriate 
length of the historical sample period. (Pritsker 2006.) 
 
Basak and Shapiro (2001) analyzed optimal, dynamic portfolios exposed to market-risk 
using VaR. They reported that VaR risk managers often optimally choose a larger 
exposure to risky assets than non-risk managers and consequently incurred larger losses 
when losses  occur.  A general-equilibrium analysis  revealed  that  the  presence  of  VaR,  
risk  managers  amplifies  the  stock-market  volatility  at  times  of  down  markets  and  
attenuates the volatility at times of up markets. An identified general shortcoming of 
VaR reveals to be the fact that it tells nothing about the size of loss when breaks occur. 
In this area Naryan (2004) also reported results showing that a large number of equity-
oriented hedge fund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a short position in a put 
option on the market index and therefore bear significant left-tail risk, risk that is 
ignored by the commonly used mean-variance framework. Using a mean-conditional 
value-at-risk framework, they demonstrate the extent to which the mean-variance 
framework underestimates the tail risk. (Basak and Shapiro 2001.) 
 
Analysing Basel II accord, McAleer (2008) found evidence that it encourages risk 
taking at the expense of providing accurate measures and forecasts of risk. The author 
suggests the improvements of optimal strategies in a risk monitoring and management. 
(McAleer 2008.) 
 
Studying VaR disclosure, Perignon and Smith (2010) formed an index from six 
components of VaR: holding period and confidence level, summary statistic, previous 
years summery, definition of trading revenue and backtesting. For the calculation of 
index value they used data for ten US & Canada banks, covering a period of ten years. 
The authors found out that Historical Simulation proofed to be by far the most popular 
method  for  computation  globally  with  most  of  the  banks  official  report  using  it.  Pie  
chart in figure 3 displays the relative frequency of each VaR calculation method used by 
sample banks. 
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Figure 3: VaR calculation method 
 
They also detected persistent overstatement of VaR, which lead to too few exceptions. 
This fact is explained to have a direct connection with the Basel Accords minimal 
capital requirements capital. The comparison showed that the quality of the revealed 
VaR information indicates little to no improvement over time. Authors conclude that 
VaR result from historical simulation does not contain a lot useful information about the 
future volatility. (Perignon & Smith 2010.)  
 
The impact of Basel Accords allowing banks to calculate their capital requirement based 
on their internal VaR models and the consequences of regulation changes on banks in 
New EU member states has not been studied well enough. Limited number of papers 
tested  VaR  models  in  developing  stock  markets.  Significant  examples  are  Santoso  
(2000) for Mexico stock exchange, Sinha & Chamu (2000) for Indonesia, Fallon & 
Sabogal 2004 for Columbia , and Valentinyi-Endrész (2004) used Hungarian market 
data. Zikovic (2007) compared the performance of historical simulation VaR models on 
stock  indexes  of  some  new  EU  member  states  and  candidate  countries  indices,  
CROBEX (Croatia), SOFIX (Bulgaria), BBETINRM (Romania) and XU100 (Turkey). 
Backtesting results show that VaR models adopted from developed stock markets are 
not particularly accurate for measuring market risk in the studied countries.  
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Gencay and Selcuk (2004) collected daily stock market data from Argentina, Brazil, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey to investigate 
the relative performance of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models with the daily stock market 
returns. In addition to the Variance Covariance method and Historical Simulation VaR, 
they also studied the extreme value theory to generate VaR estimates. Their results 
indicate that extreme value theory based VaR estimates have greater accuracy at higher 
quintiles.  
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5 METHODOLOGY 
 
The two simulations that will be conducted in this study, Historical and Monte Carlo, 
belong to the full valuation VaR methods. They measure risk by changing the full price 
of a portfolio over different scenarios. The historical simulation method consists of 
going back in time and applying current weights to a time-series of historical asset 
returns. This approach is also known as bootstrapping because it involves using the 
actual distribution of recent historical data (Jorion 2000).  Let )log(
1?
?
t
t
t p
pr  to be the 
returns at time t  where tp  is the price of an asset or a portfolio at time t . )(?tVaR at the 
)1( ??  percentile is defined by: 
 
(8) ?? ?? ))(Pr( tt VaRr   
 
which calculates the probability of returns at time t  to be less or equal to )(?tVaR , ?  
percent of the time. 
 
5.1 Historical Simulation: Model description 
 
Historical Simulation (HS) is approach that does not need many assumptions about the 
statistical distribution of the underlying market factors (Linsmaier & Pearson 1996:7). 
As RiskMetrics describe it, it is as non-parametric method of using past data to make 
interpretations about the future. Applying HS technique means to take today’s portfolio 
or assets and re-value them using the past prices. In short, HS basis consists of taking 
actual historical price changes in market rates that occurred over the last trading days 
(that would be the data window) and re-values the asset or portfolio as if those changes 
were to occur again in the next holding period.  
 
(9) tRwR
N
i
itip ,...,1,
1
,,, ???
?
???  
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HS is a direct implementation of full valuation methodology where R is historic asset 
return, N is the number of portfolio position, ?  observations times and w - the weight of 
the position (Jorion 1997:193). Distinctively, a historical VaR value is calculated by 
using historical changes in market prices to construct a distribution of potential future 
portfolio  profit  and  losses,  and  then  reading  off  it  the  VaR number  as  the  loss  that  is  
exceeded only a certain percentage of the time (Linsmeier & Pearson 1996:7).  
 
HS approximates the quantiles of an underlying distribution from the realization of the 
distribution. The VaR in this case is estimated by: 
 
(10) rFVaRt )()(
1 ?? ??  
 
where rF )(1 ??  is the q th quantile )1( ???q of the sample distribution. Statistical 
calculations are simplified as this methodology uses the actual observed changes to 
estimate expected future market changes. A lot of financial models consider markets 
and prices of instruments to be continuous in nature and that there are no sharp jumps or 
discontinuities in prices. Since HS exploits actual returns, the method captures true 
market behaviour and does not rely on the assumption of normal distribution of market 
returns (Venter 2000:6). Changes in market prices are used as input to calculate 
prospective gains and losses, so any "fat-tails" or other distortions are fully captured in 
the model (Stambaugh 1996:617).  
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Figure 4. HS Process flow chart (Source: Jorion 2000:194) 
 
There are five key steps in conducting a HS for a single financial instrument: First the 
basic market factors that affect the instrument have to be identified. Second, formula 
containing these factors and expressing the mark–to–market value of the instrument in 
the portfolio has to be obtained. The next step is to extract the historical values of the 
market factors for the last period of interest (100 and 250 days). Subjecting the chosen 
instrument to the daily changes in market rates and prices of the factors create 
hypothetical profits and losses. Then a histogram of all profits and losses is created, and 
from it the desired percentile (1% and 5%) is subtracted (Linsmeier & Pearson 
1996:15).    
 
5.1.1 Advantages 
 
HS method is relatively simple to implement if historical data is available for all the 
financial instruments over the time horizon for daily marking-to-market. Its 
intuitiveness makes it easy to explain to managers, supervisors and regulators. This 
assists in the process of acquiring conclusions from VaR analysis and supports the 
disciplines of putting risk management to work (Stambaugh 1996:617). As HS VaR is 
derived from actual prices, the method allows nonlinearities and nonnormal 
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distributions. It captures gamma, vega risk, and correlations. HS does not depend on 
specific assumptions about valuation models or the structure of the market and is not 
subject to model risk. Its biggest advantage is that it can account for fat tails (Jorion 
1997:195). HS is also able to incorporate changes in option prices with changes in 
option volatilities if they are collected and included as additional factors for the period 
used in the simulation (Linsmeier and Pearson 1996:17). HS is the most widely used 
method to compute VAR. 
 
5.1.2 Problems 
 
HS does not go without shortfalls. It can not be done without sufficient recorded history 
of price changes for all assets. Based on the data only one sample path is generated, and 
the quality of the results critically depends on the length of the chosen period. HS 
suggests that the past closely represents the immediate future. If the chosen time 
window misses important events, the tails will not be well represented or the period may 
contain events that will not reappear in the future. Linsmeier and Pearson (1996:19) 
refer to this problem as “atypical” historic data. One hidden danger of this fact is that if 
HS VaR is used as trading desk limit, this shortfall opens the door for informed traders 
to  exploit  the  model  and  take  additional  risk.  It  is  also  hard  to  perform  “what  if”  
scenarios analysis when the price path is directly linked to historic changes. HS method 
puts equal weights on all observations in the window, without considering the influence 
that most recent ones have on the immediate future. Thus, HS will be very slow to 
incorporate structural breaks. (Jorion 1997:196.) 
 
5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation: Model description 
 
Monte Carlo method (MCS) uses simulation techniques to produce huge number of 
random price paths in order to estimate the behaviour of future assets prices. In such 
fashion it generates diverse scenarios for the value of a portfolio. MCS includes wide 
range of hypothetical values of financial variables and can also implement possible 
correlations between them (Jorion 1997:231).  
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Conducting MCS for a single instrument starts the same like HS with identification of 
basic market factors and formulating its value accordingly. Afterwards, a specific 
distribution for the changes in these factors has to be estimated by the modeller. One 
has freedom to choose the distribution parameters which fits best the objectives of the 
simulation. Consequently using the random number generator, one can create sufficient 
number  (N)  of  hypothetical  values  of  changes  in  the  market  factors.  They  are  used  to  
calculate N hypothetical mark–to–market values of the instrument. Subtracting the 
actual instrument value gives us N hypothetical profits and losses, and then again 
histogram is created and VaR value is taken from it (Linsmeier and Pearson 1996:15).  
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Figure 5. MCS Process flow chart. (Source: Jorion 2000) 
 
HS and MCS are quite similar, except that in MCS the hypothetical changes in price are 
created by random draws from pre-specified stochastic process instead of sampled from 
real data set.  
 
5.2.1 Advantages 
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MCS is one of the most powerful VaR methods. If modelling of parameters is accurate 
MCS is really extensive and limited only by computational power. It is flexible enough 
to include time variation in volatility, fat tails, and extreme scenarios. It can also 
implement additional types of risk like price risk, volatility risk and to some extend 
model risk. MCS method can include also user-defined scenarios, nonlinear positions, 
nonnormal distributions and implied parameters (Jorion 1997:200.) Generally MCS is 
able to integrate price volatility randomness by extending the simulation in a manner 
that it includes a distribution of volatilities. All kind of “What-if” scenarios are 
compatible with MCS method. (Linsmeier and Pearson 1996:17.) 
 
5.2.2 Problems 
 
MCS is heavily influenced by model risk. It relies on stochastic processes for defying 
the risk factors and pricing models that can be arguable or totally wrong. Incorrect 
assumptions about the parameters of statistical distributions of market factors lead to 
mistakes in VaR values. A great deal of expertise and professionalism is needed to 
make the right choice. A portfolio with exotic options may be difficult to value if one 
lacks adequate pricing models. As finite numbers of price path replications are done, 
MCS VAR estimates can vary significantly from sample to sample. Another drawback 
is the fact that it is hard to explain it to senior managers. (Linsmeier and Pearson 
1996:17.) 
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Table 4. Comparison of VaR methodologies. (Source: Linsmeier & Pearson) 
Comparison criteria Historical   
Simulation               
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
Able to capture the risks of 
portfolios which include options? 
Yes. regardless of 
the options 
content of the 
portfolio  
Yes 
Easy to implement? Yes, for 
portfolios for 
which data on the 
past values of the 
market factors are 
available 
Yes. for portfolios 
restricted to 
instruments and 
currencies covered by 
available "off-the-
shelf software. 
Otherwise moderately 
to extremely difficult 
to implement 
Computations performed quickly? Yes No, except for 
relatively small 
portfolios 
Easy to explain to senior 
management? 
Yes No 
Produces misleading value at risk 
estimates when resent past is 
atypical? 
Yes Yes, except that 
alternatives estimates 
of parameters may be 
used  
Easy to perform “what if” analysis 
to examine effect of alternative 
assumptions? 
Yes Yes 
 
 
5.3 Value-at-Risk inputs 
Calculation of VaR requires the input of the following variables: 
5.3.1 Holding period 
 
The time window for which eventual losses will be projected can be referred as VaR 
holding period. VaR as a measure is time specific and can indicate both long term,  
month or quarter portfolio risk, as well as overnight positions risk (Verder 2000:3).  
General rule is that longer holding period carries greater risk due to the fact that 
absolute volatility increases over time. Trading VaR, revealed by most of the 
commercial banks, uses one day horizon. One  reason  for  this  is  the  liquidity  and  fast  
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turnover in their portfolios, but most important, daily  VAR  allows  to  be  easily  
compared with daily profit and loss (P&L) measures (Jorion 1997). As Minnich 
(1998:42) puts it VaR holding period should correspond to the time required to hedge 
the market risk. BCBS in Basel II proposed to regulators to scale from one day holding 
period to 10 days using the square root of time or 10  =3.16. 
 
5.3.2 Confidence level 
 
Confidence level represents the tolerance level for which the loss estimated by VaR 
value can be surpassed. The Bank for International Settlement recommends 99th 
percentile, one-tailed confidence interval to be used, but a lot of risk managers prefer to 
calculate VaR values over a 95% confidence level, such as used in the JP Morgan’s   
RiskMetrics methodology (Duffie and Pan 1997:9). The actual cost of a loss exceeding 
VAR  and  the  degree  of  risk  aversion  are  the  main  criteria  when  choosing  confidence  
level. The bigger they are, the larger the need for capital reserves to cover possible 
losses. In such a case higher confidence level should be implied (Jorion 1997; Verder 
2000). The choice of the confidence interval may not be so important if VaR is used to 
compare risk across markets. Researchers provide evidence that 95% confidence interval 
performs best under backtesting because of the existence of "fat-tails" (Minnich 
1998:42). 
 
5.3.3 Data window 
 
When calculating VaR risk professionals have to choose how much historical data to 
include in the model, or how long the data window should be. Minnich (1998:43) 
argues that longer periods have return distribution containing more examples of 
extreme  events,  while  shorter  periods  allow  VaR  values  to  react  quicker  to  changing  
market.  
 
5.4 Backtesting Value-at-Risk 
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The  most  common  tests  used  nowadays  to  evaluate  VaR  measures  of  banks  are  the  
binomial method and the interval forecast method developed by Christoffersen (1998).  
Both of these tests utilize null hypothesis that VaR estimates display a specified 
property that characterize the estimate to be a correct one. If the null hypothesis happen 
to be rejected, that signs the VaR estimate is considered to be not accurate. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, then the particular VaR model is believed to be “acceptably 
accurate”. (Lopez 1999b:4).  
 
As both tests focus on the comparison between the reported VaR estimate and the 
realized profit and loss over fixed interval of time they use a defined with mathematical 
expression as follows in equation 9 “hit” function; 
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This function sequence denotes the history whether or not realizations of losses which 
exceed VaR had happened. The task of evaluating the accuracy of a given VaR model 
can be decomposed to determining if the hit sequence [ )(1 ??tI ] satisfy two properties,  
unconditional coverage property and independence property for the whole time interval 
( Tt ;1? ) (Campbell 2005:3). The first property consists of the fact that the probability 
of loss realization must be exactly equal to %100?? .  If  the  percentage  of  losses  
surpass the VaR measure, this would imply that the actual level of risk is consistently 
underestimated. On the other hand, if there are hardly any violations of VaR, it might be 
a sigh of over conservative VaR measure. The Independence property sets restrictions 
on the frequency with which VaR violations occur. It imposes that any two elements of 
the hit sequence should be independent of each other. This rule means that the previous 
VaR violations should contain no additional information about the occurrence of new 
violation. In case those former breaches of VaR carry prediction about the possibility of 
future breaches happening, this points out to a major inadequacy of the VaR measure. 
An example of breaking independence property is the “clustering of violations” 
phenomena. (Campbell 2005:3.) Unconditional coverage and independence properties 
are separate of each other and correct VaR model have to satisfy them both.  That 
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results  in  a  combined  statement  for  the  “hit”  sequence  which  reads  that  it  has  to  be  
“identically and independently distributed (iid) as a Bernoulli random variable with 
probability ?  “. 
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t ?  
 
(Campbell 2005:4) 
 
5.4.1 Unconditional coverage test 
 
One of the earliest unconditional coverage backtests, proposed by Kupiec (1995), is 
known  as  Proportion  of  Failure  (POF)  test.   It  became  a  standard  way  of  backtesting  
different models used to forecast VaR. By counting the number of tail losses that 
exceeds VaR and comparing with the expected level of confidence POF test can 
statistically reject or accept the correctness of a particular VaR model. Theoretically, the 
setup tests whether the observed failure rate 
T
N is sufficiently close to the left tail 
probability P  for the test not to reject the model. (Lopez 1999b.)  
 
In this study the notations for this test are set as follows: observed number of tail losses 
exceeding VaR is denoted by N , the sample size is denoted byT . Since the probability 
of detecting N  exceptions in a sample sized T  is: 
 
(13) NTN
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Thus, the relevant null and alternative hypotheses are:  
 
H0: P
T
N ?  
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H1: P
T
N ?  
 
The applicable likelihood ratio ucLR statistical test as takes the form in equation 9: 
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ucLR test proved to have the greatest power for given sample size and under the null 
correct hypothesis of correct unconditional coverage the test-statistic has asymptotic 
?2(1)-distribution with one degree of freedom. A model fails the test if the p-value is 
less than 0.05 using the standard significance level. (Lopez 1999b:6.) 
 
A connection exists between the test of unconditional coverage and the capital 
requirements framework.  The market risk capital multiplier is determined by the 
number  of  VaR  violations  in  a  historic  period.  In  the  same  way  the  POF  test  is  a  
function of the amount of VaR violations in the same period. As a consequence, there is 
a tight bound between the raising of the market risk multiplier and POF test. The role of 
the market risk multiplier is actually a test for unconditional coverage that continuously 
rise the capital reserves of banks with poor model predictions. (Campbell 2005:6.)  
 
Apart from Kupiec’s POF test there exist simple statistical tests that take into account 
the unconditional coverage property of VaR models. A test can be based directly on the 
average value of VaR for given interval of time. Assuming that VaR is accurate then the 
scaled version of the time period has approximately standard normal distribution. The 
exact distribution is known to have value of z (equation 10) 
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and the same hypothesis test as for POF can be performed. (Campbell 2005:7.) 
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Tests for unconditional coverage are good benchmarks for evaluating VaR measures but 
have two major shortfalls. They have troubles detecting measures that systemically 
under report risk and do not examine for the independence property which, as 
underlined by Campbell (1995), can result into a significant risk or leverage effects and 
possible asymmetrical, clustered losses. That’s why the return sets have to be checked 
whether VaR breaks are spread across the sample and do not appear in clusters. 
 
5.4.2 Conditional coverage test 
 
VaR Estimates can be seen as interval forecasts of the of the left tail percentile of one 
step ahead return distribution. This interval forecasts can be inspected for both 
unconditional and conditional coverage. As was discussed earlier, ucLR  test is 
unconditional. However in the presence of time varying heteroskedasticity in the 
returns, the conditional accuracy of interval forecasts is also of great importance (Lopez 
1999b:6). Interval forecasts that overlook this variance dynamics may pass the 
unconditional test but will exhibit faulty conditional coverage. VaR model that lack the 
ability to take into account possible clustering of volatility are also likely to have a lot 
of breaks during intervals of high market turbulence. Inadequate volatility modelling 
leads to serial correlation in the breaks. (Lopez 1999b.) 
 
Christoffersen (1998) proposed a testing framework that is autonomous of the process 
of generating the VaR estimates. It takes into consideration whether the VaR model 
shows correct conditional coverage. Christoffersen technique includes the following 
procedures for the evaluation of interval forecasts: test for correct unconditional 
coverage, test for independence and test for correct conditional coverage. The early test 
that account for the independence property of the “hit” function was based on the 
Markov  chain  process,  which  has  the  property  that  one  state  of  such  discrete  random  
process depends only on the previous state. Accordingly the test examines whether or 
not the probability of VaR break on the following day depends from the appearance of 
break today. If VaR measure is correct then the probability of VaR violation occurrence 
now should be independent from whether or not break happened yesterday (Campbell 
2005:8).  
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If  a  VaR  model  truly  captures  the  conditional  distribution  of  the  returns,  then  breaks  
should be independently distributed over time. Tested against alternative of first order 
Markov dependence, the likelihood ratio will take the form:  
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 ijT  denotes the number of observations in state j  after having been in state i  the 
period before 
0100
01
01 TT
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??  Under the null hypothesis of serial 
independence  
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the relevant likelihood function is  
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Where 
T
TT 1101 ??? , T is the total number of observations. The test statistic for 
independence has the form as in equation 14, and asymptotic 2? (1) distribution. (Lopez 
1996b.) 
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The test for correct conditional coverage ccLR  actually consists of two tests, one for 
correct unconditional coverage and one for serial independence. The necessary and 
sufficient condition for VaR model to pass it is they should be both satisfied.  The 
relevant test statistic is: 
 
(20) induccc LRLRLR ??   
 55
 
This joint test statistic has asymptotical distribution 2? (2). (Lopez 1999b.) 
 
This initial independence test was later developed by Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004) 
to incorporate the assumption that if VaR violations exhibit complete independence, 
then the amount of time between two VaR breaks should be independent of the amount 
of time that passed since last break. 
 
5.4.3 Regulatory loss functions 
 
Underestimation of losses is important for supervisors while bank risk managers may be 
more concerned about higher VaR prediction values which lead to higher capital 
adequacy requirements. Lopez (1999b:7) suggested a regulatory loss function test in 
order to evaluate the accuracy of the VaR estimates. Unlike the previously revealed 
tests, this one does not involve hypothesis testing, but rather gives numerical 
measurement in accordance with specific regulatory concerns. This method provides 
comparative measure of performance through time and between different banks. The 
general form of this loss function of financial institution i  at time t  is: 
 
(21) 
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
?
mttmtt
mttmtt
mt VaR   ?)     if  ,VaRg(?
VaR    ?)      if ,VaRf(?
C
11
11
1  
 
1?t?  represent the realized profit or loss, and ),( yxf f and ),( yxg are functions that 
satisfy ),(),( yxgyxf ? . The numerical scores have negative orientation which means 
lower value of 1?mtC are better, since breaks are given higher score. The sum for the 
whole interval will be: 
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After loss function is defined and mC  calculated, a benchmark can be calculated in 
order to evaluate the comparative performance of mtVaR  estimates. Accurate VaR 
models should provide lower score then inaccurate ones. Different regulatory loss 
functions  can  be  created.  This  work  will  utilize  two  different  loss  functions,  a  binary  
loss function (BLF) that takes into consideration whether at any given days the loss is 
greater or smaller than the VaR estimate, and a loss function adjusted for the change in 
the regulatory capital multiplier. (Lopez 1999:b.) 
 
BLF counts whether the actual loss is larger or smaller than the VaR estimate. It is 
simply concerned about the number of failures. If VaR??t ??1 , g is given value of 1, it is 
a break, with all others events having a value of 0. 
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6 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
New EU member states present significant differences in the dynamics of financial 
markets, compared to older member’s economies. EU new member states experience 
higher financial turbulence, higher variability of liquidity, smaller trading volumes and 
shorter  history  of  time  series  of  returns.  Since  a  considerable  amount  of  capital  from  
developed economies is invested in developing markets by banks, hedge and mutual 
funds, a careful investigation of the market dynamics in these economies would assist 
investors by increasing their awareness (Zikovic 2007:329). To answer the question 
which VaR models appropriately capture the market risk in the EU new member states, 
two VaR models are tested on the stock index. The tested VaR models are: Historical 
Simulation with rolling windows of 100 and 250 days, and Monte Carlo Simulation. For 
illustrating of rolling window technique take a window size of 250 days. The time 
interval is placed between the 1st and the 250th data points. Then VaR value forecast is 
obtained for the 251st day. The window is moved one period ahead to 2nd and 251st 
data points to obtain a forecast of the 252nd day return and so on for the whole period 
of observation. 
 
Stock indices can be treated as a portfolio of selected securities from individual country. 
In this thesis, the performance of selected VaR models is tested on Bulgaria stock index 
(SOFIX)  and  compared  with  the  behaviour  of  five  world  major  market  indices:  S&P  
500, FTSE 100, NASDAQ, Dow Jones, DAX, Stockholm General for matching periods 
of time. VaR values are calculated for a one-day holding period at 95% and 99% 
confidence intervals of risk. To be sure that the same out of the sample VaR backtesting 
period  is  used  for  all  of  the  tested  indexes,  the  data  sets  are  matched  on  to  the  latest  
observations from each index. The rest of the observations are used as pre samples 
needed for VaR initial calculation. Analyzed VaR models validity is tested by Kupiec 
test, Christoffersen independence test, and Lopez test. 
 
6.1 Overview of the Bulgarian stock exchange  
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Bulgarian  Stock  Exchange  (BSE)  was  officially  licensed  by  the  state  securities  and  
exchange commission and started functioning on October 9, 1997. It is the country’s 
only operating stock exchange. Situated in Sofia, BSE operates within the Bulgarian 
legislation framework. It provides the execution of all trading activities in compliance 
with  the  Markets  in  Financial  Instruments  Act  and  the  Law  on  public  offering  of  
securities. BSE rules and regulations are governed by BSE-Sofia Board of directors. 
Official regulator of the stock market is the state financial supervision commission. Its 
main purpose is to exercise control to safeguard the investors and to reinforce the 
evolution of a transparent and efficient securities market. The Commission is an 
independent state body and operates under the authority the Parliament. It regulates and 
controls: regulated securities markets, Central Depository, investment intermediaries, 
investment companies, management companies, natural persons who are directly 
engaged in securities transactions and investment consultancy, public companies and 
other issuers of securities according the Law on Public Offering of Securities and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Act. (BSE 2007.) 
 
The Commission acts as a controller over public companies and issuers. It is 
accountable for issues and withdraws of licenses and emits confirmations and public 
offering approvals. Its authorities audit the investment and depositories operation of 
banks  and  organize  the  information  disclosure  between  the  state  institutions,  self-
governance administration and non-governmental organizations related to the securities 
market. (BSE 2007.) 
 
6.2 SOFIX index 
 
SOFIX is the first and most popular index of BSE-Sofia. Officially its calculation 
started on October 20, 2000. Its value is derived from the market capitalization of the 
shares of the twenty most liquid companies traded on the market. Daily adjustments are 
made for the free float (FF) of each share. FF represents the shares hold by minority 
shareholders which have no more than five percent of the votes at the company general 
meeting. In order for a company to be included in the index it should meet the following 
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criteria: Its shareholders should be no less than five hundred persons and the total value 
of trades for its issued shares during the last twelve months should be larger than 1,25 
million €. The number of all transactions made in the same period must be bigger than 
one thousand. Also FF of the company should be greater than ten percent of the total 
amount of issued shares. 
 
SOFIX daily value is calculated using the following methodology: the index base value 
(or the value from the previous trade day) is multiplied by the ratio of the sum of the 
market capitalisations of all issues for each company in the index portfolio as  of  the  
current  moment  and  the  sum  of  the  market  capitalization  for  the  previous  or  base  
moment. Both of these sums are adjusted by a weight factor W, the free float FF and a 
divisor  D.  The  market  capitalization  of  each  company  is  calculated  as  product  of  the  
number of the issued shares and the price taken from the newest deal on the market. For 
each daily individual company capitalization there is an upper cap limit of fifteen 
percent of the total daily SOFIX capitalization. If there are no deals for the shares of a 
company throughout the session, for the purpose of SOFIX calculation the last trading 
price from previous days is taken. The interval for index value update during a trading 
session is one minute. The Indices Committee meeting decides each quarter how much 
the weight and free-float factors shall be changed, taking into account their proportions 
for the new periods. (BSE 2007.) 
  
The official formula for SOFIX calculation is as follow: 
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Where tiN ,  stands for the number of shares of the issue of the respective company on 
the day t, 1, ?tiN  is the number of shares of the issue of the respective company on the t-1 
day, tiP ,  is the price of the latest trade in the i-th security on the t day, 1, ?tiP  is the price 
of  the  last  trade  in  the  i-th  security  on  the  t-1  day,  tiFF ,  is the free-float of the i-th 
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security on the t day, 1, ?tiFF  is the free-float of the i-th security on the t-1 day, tiW ,  is the 
weight factor of the i-th security on the t day, 1, ?tiW  is the weight factor of the i-th 
security on the t-1 day, n is the number of issues included in the index portfolio, i is the 
indicator of the specific security, t is the day for which the index is calculated, tiD ,  is 
the divisor effective for the current trading session for the i-th security, while 1, ?tiD  is 
the divisor for the i-th security on the t-1 day. K stands for the adjustment factor (?=1, 
unless the index base has been changed). Decisions for changing the base in the SOFIX 
base are taken every six months. (BSE 2007.) 
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7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
Data set of daily returns price for ten years period was collected for the following 
market indices: SOFIX, S&P 500, NASDAQ, OMXS, FTSE 100 and DAX, in order to 
give representative overview of the developed world markets and compare them with 
the new EU member state Bulgaria. Bulgarian stock exchange, Google Finance and 
Yahoo  Finance  web  pages  are  the  sources  of  this  data.  The  sample  consists  of  daily  
closing prices for the period from 24 October 2000 to 30 April 2010, corresponding to 
2367 observations. For SOFIX, the analyzed VaR models are Historical and Monte 
Carlo Simulations with rolling windows of 100 and 250 days, at 95% and 99% 
confidence level. For the other indices HS are performed with same time intervals and 
confidence levels. 
 
7.1 Indices Returns  
 
Descriptive statistics of indices daily returns are presented in Table 5. All means shown 
in column 1 are nearly zero, with SOFIX displaying the biggest positive diversion. This 
may be due to the higher inflation in Bulgaria. The average annual rate of inflation 
(consumer prices) in the country for the sample data period was 6, 84 %. Bulgarian 
stock market index also has the highest standard deviation (0.0188) of daily returns. 
According to the sample kurtosis figures, the daily rates of returns for SOFIX are far 
from being normally distributed. SOFIX kurtosis is over three times bigger than this of 
the other indices. This shows that the return distribution of Bulgarian markets have 
much fatter tail. The lowest kurtosis is exhibited by OMXS with value of 4,02. Column 
4 of the descriptive statistic table shows that Indices returns have both positive and 
negative skewness. For SOFIX skewness is negative, indicating longer left tail, 
extended more towards negative values. SOFIX distribution appears to be left-skewed. 
Columns 6 and 7 of the table show the highest and lowest 1 day return for each index. 
The highest 1 day positive and negative returns are observed for SOFIX and NASDAQ. 
DAX and OMXS have lowest values in the category. The minimum and maximum 
statistics for SOFIX are comparatively large and that indicates the presence of extreme 
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returns. They can be observed in Figure 8-11 where returns are plotted. Plots exhibit 
extreme spikes. 
 
Table 5. Indices Daily P&L Summary Statistics. 
Daily Profit & Loss 
Index Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
SOFIX 0.0006 0.0188 25.0685 -0.5648 0.4197 -0.2090 0.2107 
S&P 500 0.0001 0.0139 8.3108 -0.1223 0.2043 -0.0947 0.1096 
NASDAQ 0.0000 0.0177 5.1678 0.1965 0.2284 -0.0959 0.1325 
OMXS 0.0001 0.0149 4.0238 0.0355 0.1662 -0.0799 0.0863 
FTSE 100 0.0001 0.0134 6.5040 -0.1126 0.1865 -0.0926 0.0938 
DAX 0.0000 0.0167 4.4285 0.0643 0.1823 -0.0743 0.1080 
 
Figure 6 presents QQ-plot of SOFIX returns compared to normal distribution. This plot 
also indicates that the series distribution is not normal. The QQ-plot does not follow flat 
diagonal line. SOFIX distribution is more skewed than Normal and has heavier tails and 
sharp peak. 
 
 
Figure 6. Quantile Quantile plotting of SOFIX Returns 
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Table 6. Autocorrelations and Partial Autocorrelations of SOFIX Returns 
ACF, PACF and Ljung-Box Q test for mean adjusted returns and squared returns for SOFIX index in the 
period 24 October 2000 to 30 April 2010. 
 
  
 
The presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in SOFIX returns is obvious 
from the ACF, PACF and Ljung-Box Q statistics of the returns and squared returns of 
SOFIX index in the corresponding correlograms (table 6). In the correlogram of the 
squared returns, the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations are not zero for all 
lags. Such finding is troublesome for VaR models, based on normality assumption and 
for nonparametric approaches, which are based on the identically and independently 
distributed, iid, assumption, such as the historical simulation. Risk managers should be 
alert because VaR models elementary assumptions are not satisfied, meaning that VaR 
figures derived from such models cannot be completely trusted. 
 
The obtained results so far show that normal distribution assumption poorly describes 
the fat tail and sharp peak characteristics of SOFIX index. In such cases Student’s T 
distribution is proven to work better. To have a graphic comparison between returns 
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histogram, normal distribution, and T distribution, distribution fitting is presented in 
Figure 7. Student’s T distribution fits much closer to the realized historical returns. 
 
 
Figure 7. SOFIX Daily Profit/Loss Distributions vs. Normal & Student’s T  
Histograms of daily trading profit and loss reported from 24 October 2000 up to 30 April 2010 for SOFIX 
 
Compared with the other indices, SOFIX exhibits asymmetry and leptokurtosis. It can 
be said with great certainty that its  returns are not normally distributed and so we can 
reject the hypothesis of normal distribution. 
 
7.2 VaR Results 
 
The realized daily returns and SOFIX VaR values calculated by HS and MCS with data 
windows of 100 and 250 days for 95% and 99% confidence level are presented in 
figures 8 to 11. All other market Indices are shown in appendix 1. For the MC 
procedure, 250 random draws from normal distribution (with mean and standard 
deviation calculated from the previous observed real historical returns) were produced 
for each trading day throughout 10 years historical data. MCS VaR is calculated as 
percentile of these daily pseudo distributions. VaR violations, the situation when Loss is 
bigger than VaR level are clearly visible. The plot of log returns indicates volatility-
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clustering phenomenon, large and small swings tend to cluster. From the figures it is 
clearly seen how the performance of different VaR models is affected by the length of 
the used data window. As expected, 100 days window is more responsive to changes in 
returns and the graph fits closer to the returns plot, while 250 days window displays lags 
and fewer variations after periods with big negative jumps in returns. HS and MCS VaR 
exhibits quite similar behaviour, using one and the same confidence level and data 
window. This can be explained by the fact that for MCS calculations, mean and 
standard deviation parameters are derived from the historic SOFIX returns. 
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Figure 8. Daily Profit and Loss and VaR 99% Forecasts with 250 days window 
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Time series of SOFIX daily trading profit and loss plotted with two model forecasts of the 1-day ahead 
99th percentile P&L. The two models are HS and MCS VaR models using history of 250 trading days  
window. 
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Figure 9. Daily Profit and Loss and VaR 99% Forecasts with 100 days window 
 
 67
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
24
/1
0/
20
02
24
/1
0/
20
03
24
/1
0/
20
04
24
/1
0/
20
05
24
/1
0/
20
06
24
/1
0/
20
07
24
/1
0/
20
08
24
/1
0/
20
09
Returns
SOFIX
MCS
VaR 
95% 250
HS VaR
95% 250
days
 
Figure 10. Daily Profit and Loss and VaR 95% Forecasts with 250 days window 
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Figure 11. Daily Profit and Loss and VaR 95% Forecasts with 100 days window 
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Table 7. Mean VaR values summary. 
Mean VaR VaR 99% VaR 95%  
   250 days 100 days 250 days  100 days 
SOFIX HS -4.59% -3.54% -2.29% -2.11% 
SOFIX MCS -3.49% -3.56% -2.50% -2.55% 
S&P500 HS -3.17% -2.72% -2.07% -1.93% 
NASDAQ HS -3.54% -3.09% -2.51% -2.30% 
OMXS HS -3.52% -3.01% -2.27% -2.14% 
FTSE100 HS -3.31% -2.83% -2.02% -1.93% 
DAX HS -3.97% -3.44% -2.59% -2.41% 
 
Mean values for all calculated VaR models during the whole observation sample are 
presented in Table 7. As expected, 250 days data window produces higher VaR values 
for  all  HS.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  regulatory  use  of  250  days  for  the  
calculation of capital reserves. The variation in the developed market indices is quite 
small, little over half a percent, while SOFIX mean is on average 1 % higher. SOFIX 
and DAX exhibit the highest mean VaR values. MCS performance is contrary to that of 
HS and we witness higher VaR for 100 days observations However, the difference is 
not big and varies with the simulation cycles.  
  
Table 8 reports the actual violation rates for the VaR models, occurred during the whole 
sample  period.  With  2116  observations,  at  the  99  %  confidence  level  P&L  would  be  
expected to violate VaR around 21 times and for the 95 % this level should be 
approximately 106. All HS VaR 99% confidence level results are significantly higher 
than the expectance rate. For HS VaR 99%, calculated with 250 days interval, violations 
are less than these for HS VaR99% with 100 days interval. This fact indicates that 
overall, HS VaR 99% methods underestimate actual market risk level. This is a 
concerning finding for both regulators and risk managers. For HS VaR 95% breaks are 
still higher than the assumed level, though not as high as for 99%. HS VaR 95% level 
seems to match better the real risk and outperform VaR99% measure. These results 
justify VaR 95% popularity among risk practitioners. However, the same characteristic, 
less violation with 250 days window and more with 100 days interval is also observed 
for 95% confidence level. 250 days interval proves to be more reliable. Contradicting 
results were obtained from the MCS. While MCS VaR 99% produced worst results 
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compared  to  HS  for  both  time  intervals,  at  95%  confidence  level  MCS  was  the  best  
performer and the only model with less then expected breaks level.  
 
Table 8. VaR Violations number across indices with HS and MCS for SOFIX. 
Daily VaR violations counted in matching sample of 2116 observations. 
 
VaR Violations 
number VaR 99% VaR 95%  
   250 days 100 days 250 days  100 days 
SOFIX HS 33 43 107 125 
SOFIX MCS 58 53 94 103 
S&P500 HS 38 46 119 127 
NASDAQ HS 31 38 104 119 
OMXS HS 35 43 114 136 
FTSE100 HS 37 45 107 121 
DAX HS 28 43 122 127 
 
7.3 Correlation analysis 
 
Table 9. Correlation of P&L across Indices. 
Correlations calculated with matched sample of daily P&L with 2367 observations. 
 
Returns   SOFIX S&P 500 NASDAQ OMXS FTSE100 DAX 
SOFIX 1.0000      
S&P 500 0.0141 1.0000     
NASDAQ 0.0227 0.9008 1.0000    
OMXS 0.0085 0.0252 0.0273 1.0000   
FTSE100 0.0264 0.0239 0.0464 -0.0124 1.0000  
DAX -0.0438 0.0202 0.0207 -0.0282 0.0218 1.0000 
 
Returns correlation coefficients across indices show no significant correlation except for 
S&P 500 and NASDAQ, which is normal as they both represent US market. DAX, 
OMXS and FTSE 100 exhibit small negative correlation values. Low return correlations 
reflect the differences in market compositions across various countries.  
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Tables  10  to  13  display  correlations  between the  different  HS and  MCS VaR models.  
All VaR results show high positive correlation. The model with 95% confidence level 
and 250 days window displayed the highest results. Generally 99% coverage VaR 
displayed lower correlation than 95%, and VaR models with 100 days events window 
were less correlated compared to 250 days. In all correlation tables HS and MCS VaR 
for SOFIX have values higher than 0,9 which represents the fact that major parameters 
for MCS were estimated from historical distribution. These findings are consistent with 
the observed speed with which the recent financial crisis spread over the Global 
Financial Market and are in contrast with the insignificant daily cross-correlations in 
P&L. 
 
Table 10. Correlations of VaR 99% 250 days Across Indices. 
Correlations calculated with matched sample of daily VaR estimates with 2116 observations. 
 
VaR 99% 
250 days   
SOFIX 
HS 
SOFIX 
MCS 
S&P 500 
HS 
NASDAQ 
HS 
OMXS 
HS 
FTSE100 
HS 
DAX 
HS 
SOFIX HS 1       
SOFIX 
MCS 0.95993 1      
S&P 500 
HS 0.71764 0.69211 1     
NASDAQ 
HS 0.87601 0.85322 0.932345 1    
OMXS HS 0.58503 0.57234 0.898346 0.83562 1   
FTSE100 
HS 0.71787 0.69671 0.918214 0.88221 0.90502 1  
DAX HS 0.79372 0.80083 0.849353 0.89707 0.787902 0.92933 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71
Table 11. Correlations of VaR 95% 250 days Across Indices. 
VaR 95% 
250 days   
SOFIX 
HS 
SOFIX 
MCS 
S&P 
500 HS 
NASDAQ 
HS 
OMXS 
HS 
FTSE100 
HS 
DAX 
HS 
SOFIX HS 1       
SOFIX 
MCS 0.92095 1      
S&P 500 
HS 0.90061 0.75474 1     
NASDAQ 
HS 0.92091 0.89991 0.91677 1    
OMXS HS 0.82948 0.71992 0.94834 0.89787 1   
FTSE100 
HS 0.84074 0.73693 0.95039 0.91381 0.96622 1  
DAX HS 0.72511 0.69688 0.81065 0.86316 0.8457 0.91032 1 
 
Table 12. Correlations of VaR 99% 100 days Across Indices. 
VaR 99% 
100 days 
SOFIX 
HS 
SOFIX 
MCS 
S&P 
500 HS 
NASDAQ 
HS 
OMXS 
HS 
FTSE100 
HS 
DAX 
HS 
SOFIX HS 1       
SOFIX 
MCS 0.90913 1      
S&P 500 
HS 0.45239 0.60773 1     
NASDAQ 
HS 0.71068 0.79323 0.91317 1    
OMXS HS 0.35568 0.45574 0.8079 0.73859 1   
FTSE100 
HS 0.43415 0.56214 0.92474 0.8498 0.8524 1  
DAX HS 0.48661 0.66546 0.75318 0.76595 0.71191 0.82715 1 
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Table 13. Correlations of VaR 95% 100 days Across Indices. 
VaR 95% 
100 days 
SOFIX 
HS 
SOFIX 
MCS 
S&P 
500 HS 
NASDAQ 
HS 
OMXS 
HS 
FTSE100 
HS 
DAX 
HS 
SOFIX HS 1       
SOFIX 
MCS 0.9279 1      
S&P 500 
HS 0.7151 0.63805 1     
NASDAQ 
HS 0.81695 0.83741 0.86267 1    
OMXS HS 0.63866 0.57216 0.90987 0.81011 1   
FTSE100 
HS 0.62504 0.5908 0.91473 0.81504 0.90873 1  
DAX HS 0.57124 0.5874 0.82019 0.78588 0.82627 0.91401 1 
 
7.4 Backtesting results 
 
Backtesting procedure was carried out in order to validate the accuracy of the HS and 
MCS 99 % VaR values for 250 days interval for SOFIX return. This chioce is based on 
the official Basel II regulatory reporting standard. Returns from year 2000 were used to 
generate initial VaR values. Altogether nine years of market data are presented in table 
14. Reported values are taken from the last trading day of each year. Column 2 present 
the sum of yearly breaks, column 3 LR un is the likelihood ratio value and p value 
indicates the probability of the actual violation rate if the null of 1 % expect rate is true. 
The null hypothesis of Kupiec’s unconditional coverage backtest is that daily P&L will 
violate VaR at an expected rate of 1 %.  
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Table 14. Kupiec’s test results for unconditional coverage of HS & MCS VaR 99% 250 
days for SOFIX index.  
The presented values are taken for the last trading day of each Year. The p-value is computed in Excel 
using the cumulative ?2-distribution with one degree of freedom P = CHI2DIST (LR; 1) 
 
Unconditional Coverage 
 HS SOFIX MCS SOFIX 
Year 
Sum of 
breaks  LR un 
P 
value 
Sum of 
breaks  LR un 
P 
value 
2009 0 na na 0 na na 
2008 12 8.2586 0.0041 25 31.3733 0.0000 
2007 12 8.2586 0.0041 14 11.1962 0.0008 
2006 1 0.5109 0.4747 1 0.5109 0.4747 
2005 3 0.0412 0.8391 8 3.3586 0.0669 
2004 3 0.0412 0.8391 5 0.8498 0.3566 
2003 0 na na 1 0.5109 0.4747 
2002 2 0.0471 0.8282 4 0.3340 0.5633 
2001 0 na na 0 na na 
 
The Backtest results are compared in line with Basel II framework for the minimal 
capital requirements multiplication factor. As previously described, the multiplier for 
capital  requirements begins to rise in the yellow zone after four VaR violations in the 
previous 250 days. This threshold equals to a value of 0.33 for the Kupiec’s POF test. 
The threshold for the red zone with ten VaR violations in which the multiplier is set to 
its maximal value of 4.0 (the underlying VaR model is deemed inaccurate) is equal to a 
POF test value of 5,6. Each reported result is less likely, if it have lower p-value, in case 
the null hypothesis is true. The reported p-values are at 1% of significance, 
correspondingly the null hypothesis is rejected if p is less then 0,01. For years 2007 and 
2008, both simulations fail the unconditional coverage test. MCS has almost twice 
higher level of breaks in 2008, compared with HS. This finding confirms the previous 
conclusion that based on the Normal distribution assumption MCS will perform badly 
in high volatile markets. MCS also produced twice higher break number compared with 
HS in year 2005, though both models still passed Kupiec’s test. All other investigated 
periods produced correct unconditional coverage. It have to be pointed out that year 
2000 had extremely high volatility level, with the initial establishment of the Bulgarian 
stock exchange. This historical interval produced high VaR estimates that were not 
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broken in the following 2001 even once. It is the same case in years 2003 and 2009. 
MCS however did produce a break in year 2003.   
 
To further explore the behaviour of VaR measures, SOFIX market return’s volatility 
and Lopez’s Binary Loss Function were plotted in Figures 12 to 15 for HS and MCS 
with 95% and 99% coverage for both time windows (for the other indices HS see plots 
in appendix 1). An intuitive property of a VaR (since the VaR is a quantile) is that it is 
positively related to volatility. Under some distribution assumptions for the revenues, as 
Jorion (2000) showed, the relationship between VaR and volatility should be linear. 
Results for SOFIX display such behaviour for 95% 250 days model. This model 
produced  almost  identical  BLF  for  the  two  simulations.  Generally,  both  HS  &  MCS  
exhibit similar behaviour for 250 days period, while for 100 the differences between 
them become obvious. In all plots MCS VaR deviates stronger from the expected level 
of breaks than HS. This observation seems due to the normal distribution assumption 
implemented in the MCS and the low number of simulations loops preformed because 
of computational power limitations and long historical return data set. For the 250 
window under both percentages of confidence, we observe persistent drops in VaR 
break values in periods when market volatility is in steep decline. Obviously in such 
time intervals 250 days VaR models over predict market risk. In fact the highest VaR 
breaks levels are observed during steep volatility jumps, while even when volatility 
levels are high, if no big jumps are present, VaR break level goes down. VaR with 100 
days data window produces not such clear pattern of behaviour, with both HS and MCS 
varying regularly above and below expectance level. Still, MCS again exhibit higher 
level of breaks for 95% coverage. It is clear that shorter observation window is 
reflecting better the changes in volatility, and according to BLF results, HS for SOFIX 
outperformed MCS.  
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Figure 12. Binary Loss Function plot for VaR 99 % 250 days window. 
1% expectance level is shown as flat black line. 
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Figure 13. Binary Loss Function plot for VaR 99 % 100 days window. 
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Figure 14. Binary Loss Function plot for VaR 95 % 250 days window. 
5% expectance level is shown as flat black line. 
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Figure 15. Binary Loss Function plot for VaR 95 % 100 days window. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
 
Employed tests over the distribution of daily returns of SOFIX index showed that it 
exhibit substantial differences from the developed financial markets worldwide. 
Bulgarian Stock exchange returns are characterized by significant asymmetry and high 
kurtosis that leads to rejection of the hypothesis of normal distribution. Autocorrelation 
was found in the squared returns of SOFIX index. This phenomenon breaches the 
normality assumption, as well as the “identical and independent distributed” 
assumption, which is a necessary requirement for the appropriate implementation of HS. 
As elementary model postulates is not satisfied, the derived VaR figures cannot be 
completely trusted.  
 
Both of the performed simulations in this study, HS and MCS, provided satisfactory 
unconditional coverage for the period 2001-2006. In times of low market volatility HS 
VaR 99% models with 250 days data window over predict market risk. For the volatile 
period of the recent market crisis 2007-2009 none of the models passed the 
unconditional coverage test. The highest VaR breaks levels were observed during steep 
volatility jumps which indicate that VaR reacts poorly to volatility changes and 
underestimate risk in such conditions. This finding confirms study Hypothesis III. 
 
According to BLF results, HS with 99% confidence level for SOFIX outperformed 
MCS,  and  250  days  interval  proves  to  be  more  reliable  than  100  days.  However,  HS 
uses only realized past returns to calculate VaR and these returns in the observed 
window have a crucial influence on the acceptability of HS model, consequently on 
MCS models based on historical values. Depending only on past realized market returns 
can give a deteriorated estimate of true level of risk. Results lead to the conclusion that 
even though HS provided correct unconditional coverage for most of the observed time, 
use of only HS (particularly based on short observation periods) is not recommendable 
as regulatory capital requirement criteria in new EU markets.  
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Based on the backtesting results it can be derived that VaR models that are commonly 
used in developed stock markets are not well suited for measuring market risk in EU 
new member states in time of severe market crisis. Although there is a common belief 
that more information is better, for investors, creditors, and other users of VaR 
information, primarily concern should be the accuracy of measures. It seems not enough 
to simply implement ready VaR models offered by software providers. Regulators have 
to be particularly concerned with simplistic VaR models that are popular in developed 
countries. They are not well suited for illiquid and developing stock markets. This 
makes proper VaR estimation more complicated and requires complex computational 
and intelligence demanding VaR models. For such reasons, before allowing banks in 
new EU member states to use internal VaR models, regulators should analyse the 
backtesting performance and the theoretical framework of any model for inconsistencies 
or redundant simplifications. 
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APPENDIX 1. RETURN PLOTS & VAR VALUE FOR S&P 500, NASDAQ, 
OMXS, FTSE 100 AND DAX. 
S&P 500
15 A
pril 2009
15 A
pril 2008
16 A
pril 2007
12 A
pril 2006
13 A
pril 2005
13 A
pril 2004
11 A
pril 2003
12 A
pril 2002
05 A
pril 2001
05 A
pril 2000
08 A
pril 1999
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 99% 250
days window
Var 99% 100
days window
 
FTSE 100
15 A
pril 2009
16 A
pril 2008
17 A
pril 2007
18 A
pril 2006
19 A
pril 2005
20 A
pril 2004
22 A
pril 2003
22 A
pril 2002
20 A
pril 2001
19 A
pril 2000
22 A
pril 1999
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 99% 100
days window
Var 99% 250
days window
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DAX
15 A
pril 2009
18 A
pril 2008
18 A
pril 2007
21 A
pril 2006
29 A
pril 2005
06 M
ay 2004
09 M
ay 2003
10 M
ay 2002
10 M
ay 2001
12 M
ay 2000
17 M
ay 1999
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 99% 250
days window
Var 99% 100
days window
 
OMXS
15 A
pril 2009
10 A
pril 2008
12 A
pril 2007
25 A
pril 2006
06 M
ay 2005
19 M
ay 2004
02 June 2003
13 June 2002
-10.00%
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
Return
Var 99% 250
days window
Var 99% 100
days window
 
 87
NASDAQ
15 April 2009
15 April 2008
16 April 2007
12 April 2006
13 April 2005
13 April 2004
11 April 2003
12 April 2002
05 April 2001
05 April 2000
08 April 1999
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 99% 250
days window
Var 99% 100
days window
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pril 2003
12 A
pril 2002
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pril 2001
05 A
pril 2000
08 A
pril 1999
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 95% 250
days window
Var 95% 100
days window
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FTSE 100
15 A
pril 2009
16 A
pril 2008
17 A
pril 2007
18 A
pril 2006
19 A
pril 2005
20 A
pril 2004
22 A
pril 2003
22 A
pril 2002
20 A
pril 2001
19 A
pril 2000
22 A
pril 1999
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-10.00%
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Return
Var 95% 250
days window
Var 95% 100
days window
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15 A
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21 A
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09 M
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10 M
ay 2002
10 M
ay 2001
12 M
ay 2000
17 M
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-10.00%
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10.00%
15.00%
Return
Var 95% 100
days window
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pril 2009
17 A
pril 2008
20 A
pril 2007
21 A
pril 2006
25 A
pril 2005
27 A
pril 2004
30 A
pril 2003
02 M
ay 2002
30 A
pril 2001
02 M
ay 2000
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
VaR 95% 250
days %of breaks
VaR 95% 100
days %of breaks
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VaR 99% 100
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